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Borrower who obtains preliminary injunction enjoining trustee’s

sale of home is “prevailing borrower” entitled to attorney fees under CC
§2924.12; permanent injunction is not required.

Monterossa v Superior Court (2015) 237 CA4th 747

In 2005, petitioners obtained a $359,650 mortgage from PNC Mortgage for the purchase of a home. In 2013,
petitioners became unable to make their mortgage payments and contacted PNC for hardship assistance. PNC
failed to send a hardship assistance package to petitioners. Despite that failure, PNC later notified petitioners that
their request for hardship assistance was denied “because PNC did not receive a completed hardship assistance
package” from petitioners and recorded a notice of default. In November 2013, petitioners submitted a loan
modification agreement to PNC; in December 2013, PNC confirmed that it had received a complete package.
Despite that pending loan modification, PNC recorded a notice of trustee’s sale of the property in January 2014.
Petitioners immediately called PNC and were told that their loan modification had been denied due to missing
documents.
In April 2014, petitioners sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and an order to show cause regarding a
preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the trustee’s sale of their home. The superior court granted the TRO,
enjoining the sale of the home pending a May 2014 hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. At that hearing,
the court found (on undisputed evidence) that PNC had engaged in “dual tracking” by recording a notice of
trustee’s sale while engaged in the loan modification process (prohibited by CC §2924.6(c)) and granted the
preliminary injunction.
Petitioners then filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under CC §2924.12(i). The superior court denied the
motion on the grounds that


Statutory attorney fees are awardable only at the end of the case; and

 The statute did not specifically provide for an interim award of attorney fees on a grant of provisional relief
such as a preliminary injunction.
Petitioners appealed by writ of mandate petition. The court of appeal granted a peremptory writ, reasoning that
the term “injunctive relief” as used in CC §2924.12(i) clearly encompasses both preliminary and permanent
injunctions.
The remedies provided in CC §2924.12(i) for prevailing borrowers give teeth to the prohibition against dual
tracking and other statutory protections for borrowers during the loan modification process. The remedies are
different, depending on whether a trustee’s sale deed has been recorded. Under CC §2924.12(i), a borrower is

deemed to have prevailed if he or she “obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages.” The court held that,
for purposes of CC §2924.12(i), a borrower who has obtained a preliminary injunction has prevailed in obtaining
injunctive relief. Both the purpose of the statutory scheme (to ensure borrowers have a meaningful opportunity to
avoid foreclosure) and the legislative history behind CC §2924.12(i) support this conclusion.
The trial court erred in interpreting CC §2924.12(i) as precluding an award of attorney fees and costs if a
borrower obtains only a preliminary rather than a permanent injunction. The court of appeal noted that under this
unique statutory scheme, “in many cases the best a [borrower] can hope to achieve is a preliminary injunction.”
237 CA4th at 754. The superior court was directed to vacate its order denying the motion for attorney fees and
costs and to consider it on its merits.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: This borrower prevailed—and was awarded attorney fees and costs—by enjoining the
bank’s dual tracking, but not by ending the bank’s foreclosure process. This means that after the bank corrects its
mistakes, it can complete its foreclosure. Although it certainly cannot add to the amount due under the mortgage the
fees and costs that it was required to pay, can it offset those charges against what it is owed?
There are now crossclaims, with the borrowers owing the amount loaned to them, and the bank owing them fees
and costs as prevailing borrowers. However, since one claim is secured and the other is not, the rules of setoff may
be hard to predict or apply.—Roger Bernhardt
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